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Abstract
This paper discusses a strategy that integrates data from tracer gas experiments with results from pedestrian
simulation software in the evaluation of different evacuation procedures for subway stations in response
to a fire or a terrorist attack with chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and enhanced conventional
weapons (CBRNE). The study demonstrates that by combining the two data sets a greater understanding
of the impact of different evacuations routes on an evacuee’s health is gained. It is shown that by controlling
the routes pedestrians would use to exit a subway station, the number of fatalities and evacuees with long term
health issues can be reduced. It is highlighted that a dynamic evacuation guiding system based on subway
climatology would take into account the source of the toxin, the resulting dispersal of gas, smoke, etc. and the
subway climatology at the time. In doing so, it would be possible to identify the most endangered areas and
guide passengers via an adaptive escape route using audio and visual techniques. Information on the evolution
of the emergency situation could also simultaneously be relayed back to the rescue forces to help to plan the
rescue and evacuation procedures and optimise the deployment of the search and rescue teams.
Keywords: pedestrian simulation, gas attack, subway climatology, tracer gas experiment, guided evacuation
1 Introduction
The key question of this research is to examine the
evacuation capabilities of one of the most frequented
stations within Berlin, in the event of a terrorist at-
tack with chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
and enhanced conventional weapons (CBRNE). Previ-
ous research carried out as part for the project “Cross-
organizational hazard prevention to protect human life
and critical infrastructures by optimised prevention and
reaction” (OrGaMIR), funded by the German Ministry
of Research and education (BMBF), examined the in-
terchange stations Hermannplatz, Berliner Straße and
Osloer Straße (Pflitsch, 2011). It was shown that the
internal chimney effect plays a major role in the disper-
sion of airborne toxins that may very quickly reach exits
via staircases making them unsafe as an escape route
(Pflitsch et al., 2013). The subsequent OrGaMIRplus
Project, of which this study is part, is now focused on
the biggest rail interchange within Berlin, Alexander-
platz. As a result of the high number of passengers who
use the subway station on a daily basis, it is potentially
a vulnerable and an attractive target for terrorist attacks.
∗Corresponding author: Markus Brüne, Workgroup Cave and Subway Cli-
matology, Department of Geography, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität-
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Furthermore, the complexity and numerous options of
exit routes can lead to inefficient and disorganised exit
procedures. The internal Handbook of emergency man-
agement (Berliner Verkehrsbetriebe, 2005) of the
Berlin subway operator (BVG) suggests for chemical or
biological attacks that passengers will be instructed to
leave the subway station immediately by the advice of
operator’s employees. Specific evacuation routes during
the self-rescue phase are not defined. However, the nu-
merous possible exit routes also allow the station to offer
a more controlled evacuation plan via pre-defined routes
based on the evacuation scenario.
This paper will discuss an initial pilot study exam-
ining the evacuation capabilities of Alexanderplatz in
response to a terrorist attack with airborne hazardous
substances. Results from tracer gas experiments will be
combined with simulated results from pedestrian mod-
elling software to assess different evacuation procedures
during an emergency situation. The combined results
will be used to compare and evaluate evacuation pro-
cedures based on free choice or pre-defined routes. The
individual strands of research based on a case study of
Alexanderplatz are discussed, before combined results
are highlighted and conclusions and possible future re-
search are considered.
This study is part of an overall research project fo-
cused on the development of an intelligent safety sys-
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tem for transportation hubs to allow the diagnosis and
evaluation of an emergency situation in order to supply
information for decision makers and evacuees. It is en-
visaged that such a system would help to formulate the
rescue and evacuation procedures by identifying areas
to concentrate the rescue teams, identifying the most en-
dangered areas and providing an adaptive escape route
system for the passengers. This is a relatively new area
of research as until recently the natural airflow regime
in subway systems was widely unknown (Pflitsch and
Küsel, 2003).
2 Case study Berlin Alexanderplatz:
climate measurements and tracer gas
experiments
The subway station Alexanderplatz (see Figure 1) is lo-
cated in the centre of Berlin and is the most used in-
terchange station in the city. Built from 1910–1913 ac-
cording to the plans by Alfred Grenander, the under-
ground station originally only consisted of one line but
from 1926 to 1930 two additional lines were added, also
built according to Grenander’s conception. Today the
subway station still consists of these three subway lines,
the North and South running U2 and U8 and the East
and West running U5. Alexanderplatz subway station is
also directly connected to a heavily used national train
station of the same name.
2.1 Subway climatology
The relatively young research field of “Subway Clima-
tology” was developed in the late 1990s by Pflitsch who
postulated that the airflow in subway systems behaved
in a similar way to that in cave systems (Pflitsch and
Küsel, 2003). Subway systems are characterized by
very few connections to the outer atmosphere. Conse-
quently, subway systems develop their own specific lo-
cal climatology: shortwave heating and long wave radia-
tive cooling processes are absent and the soil heat flux
is significantly higher due a higher surface volume ra-
tio and a higher ground temperature in urban agglom-
erations. Additionally, the anthropogenic energy release
from trains, technical equipment and passengers have to
be taken into account. On the other hand energy loss due
to latent and sensible heat transfer is highly reduced and
long wave radiation is trapped in an underground build-
ing. These factors cause a general over-warming of sub-
way tunnels compared to the outer atmosphere from late
summer to winter. Penetrating cold air and rising warm
air at the subway system’s openings to the outer atmo-
sphere drive natural air flow in the tunnels. Therefore,
in the event of a terrorist attack with CBRNE substances
inside a subway station or a fire, such climatology would
have a major effect on the dispersion of any airborne
substances released (Brüne et al., 2012; Pflitsch et al.,
2010).
2.2 Climate measurements
Since December 2011 as part of the OrGaMIRplus
project air flow has been continuously measured in each
tunnel corresponding to three subway lines. These mea-
surements, using ultrasonic anemometers (A and B Fig-
ure 3), showed that at all tunnel entrances there was a
very small inflow of air from the tunnel portals into the
station. Occasionally higher air flows were observed es-
pecially at the eastern tunnel entrance (B), shown in Fig-
ure 3. The track terminates at the western end of tunnel
entrance (A) resulting in a weak flow at this location.
The climatology measurements gathered were in ac-
cordance with what was expected for the time the exper-
iment was conducted. This first experiment was set up
during the nightly operational break in order to avoid the
influences of train traffic and to not disturb the passen-
gers. Future experiments will be performed during oper-
ational times and might be based on numerical simula-
tions (computational fluid dynamics). This will make the
scenario more realistic and give the opportunity to calcu-
late the effectiveness of evacuations routes coupled with
the dispersion of toxic gases for operational times and
other conditions (Wang and Chen, 2008; Epstein et al.,
2011). Nevertheless, tracking the propagation paths of
toxic gases in infrastructures should go hand in hand
with empirical measurements, especially when results
are used for safety purposes. During the night, train traf-
fic does not disturb air flow, so thermal effects play a ma-
jor role. Due to natural convection, warmer air masses
naturally move upwards, which was displayed clearly
by the portable anemometers III, V and VI (see Fig-
ure 2) that were installed for the tracer gas tests. Two sets
of stairs (east and west) connect the two platforms on
level 4 to the mezzanines on level 3; a central stairway
further connects each mezzanine level to level 2. There-
fore, air masses flow from both sides of each mezzanine
level towards the middle escalator and up to level 2. This
is observed on both sides (east and west).
2.3 Previous tracer experiments
Previous to this research several tracer gas experiments
were carried out by the authors at several subway sta-
tions in Berlin (Pflitsch et al., 2010; Pflitsch et al.,
2013). Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) was used, as it is non-
toxic, odourless, invisible and easily detectable due to its
very low occurrence in the atmosphere of 0.005 ppb. Ex-
periments could be done without endangering the pas-
sengers or the researchers. SF6 is six times heavier than
air, but previous experiments proved that it mixes very
rapidly with air and closely follows the air movement
(Pflitsch et al., 2010). The tracer gas was released from
a gas cylinder containing liquefied SF6, researchers were
allocated to appropriate measurement points and were
tasked with filling 60 ml syringes with the local air at one
minute intervals. The syringes were closed with a rubber
plug and the air was examined by gas chromatography
afterwards.
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Figure 1: Overview of subway station Alexanderplatz, top: cross section, bottom: plan views.
2.4 Tracer gas dispersion
The tracer gas data presented in this paper is based on a
single tracer gas experiment carried out on 6 December
2011 at 02:16 (MEZ) and is only valid for the prevailing
weather conditions. It has been proven by Pflitsch and
Küsel (2003) that the natural air flow through subway
tunnels is not constant, resulting in a changing air flow
situation within subway stations. However, this limita-
tion does not distract from the aim of this paper to show
how combining results from tracer gas experiments with
pedestrian simulations can be used to assess evacuation
procedures for underground stations during an emer-
gency situation.
For the period of the tracer gas experiment six ad-
ditional mobile ultrasonic anemometers where placed at
the mezzanines on level −3 to measure the air flow in-
side the subway station (see Figure 2). The mobile mea-
surements mostly showed up streaming air masses from
the U5 platforms (level −4) to the mezzanine west (III)
and the mezzanine east (V, VI). The exception to this
was at location IV on the mezzanine west, where it can
be assumed that descending cold air played a major role
(see Figure 6). Penetrating cold air downstream was also
observed and measured in previous work (Brüne et al.,
2012).
Following the release of 4 kg of SF6 gas over a
2 minute period, readings were recorded at each of the
21 measurement points throughout the subway station
(see Figure 4). The first high values were observed only
4 minutes after the start of the release at measurement
point 8, located on the mezzanine west, with a reading
of 1090 ppb (see Figure 5). At the same time a greater
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Figure 2: Vertical air flow measured with mobile anemometers at
the mezzanines on level −3. Locations of measurement points see
Figure 4.
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Figure 3: a) Distribution of measured air flow during operational
breaks at the tunnel entrances on level −4 (line U5) during the
experiment time and long term observations (December 2011 to
October 2015). b) Airflow observed during the experiment.
contamination reading was recorded in the higher lying
shopping street level at measurement point 16, with a
reading of 6630 ppb. Five minutes after the release, the
contamination values dropped at the western side, whilst
they rose on the eastern side. This is a result of higher
and more stable air flow towards the tunnel twelve min-
utes into the measurement (see Figure 3), so the SF6
cloud shifted to the western parts of the station. This ex-
plains the average dispersion of SF6, illustrated in Fig-
ure 15.
In the remaining areas of the subway station, includ-
ing the lowest level (level −4) where the gas was re-
leased, readings lower than 1000 ppb were recorded for
a period up to 6 minutes following the start of the re-
lease. After this period of time, significantly high read-
ing were recorded for measurement points 5 and 14 lo-
cated on level −4 and the east mezzanine level −3, re-
spectively. These values stayed high for the remaining
duration of the experiment. In contrast, over a simi-
lar time frame, recordings at measurement points 8 and
16 began to fall. Recordings at measurement point 16
gradually fell from 5 minutes after the release, while
recordings at measurement point 8 remained high before
falling more dramatically after 11 minutes.
Compared to Figure 5, the initial lack of build-up of
tracer gas on level −4 is related to the dimensions of
this space. The ceiling of platform U5 is more than 5 m
high and measures 36 m at its widest point level −4.
The large dimension of this space forms a large hall
where the tracer gas accumulated at the ceiling due to
convection and in spite of its high molar mass. The
sensors on the U5 platforms were placed approximately
1.5 m above the ground so the SF6 was not initially
recorded. But approximately six minutes after release
the platform areas were filled with the tracer gas and
significant concentrations reached the instruments and
the recorded values at point 5 began to rise.
The results from the tracer gas show that due to the
point of release and the climatic situation found within
the station at that time, the majority of the gas dispersed
up from level −4 via the west mezzanine on level −3
towards the shopping street located on level −2. This
occurred within the first 5 minutes after release. This
pathway of high contamination can be linked to the
staircase from level −4 to level −2 being relatively open
(see Figure 6), allowing SF6-contaminated air mass to
move upward very rapidly due to the thermal buoyancy
effect and accumulate in the shopping street with its low
ceiling of 2.3 m. This resulted in the concourse area and
the stairways linking level −4 to level −2 being heavily
contaminated.
3 Case study Berlin Alexanderplatz:
pedestrian simulations
To examine the evacuation capabilities of Alexander-
platz, the study adopted the use of an agent based pedes-
trian simulation software called Legion SpaceWorks.
Agent-based pedestrian modelling software is capable
of representing the attributes and behaviour of individual
agents within given environments (Castle, 2006). For
example, agents can be assigned varying degrees of prior
knowledge regarding a buildings layout (e.g. commuters
vs. tourists), different mobility (e.g. children, adults, im-
paired, runner, etc.), or different global origins (e.g. Eu-
rope, UK, Asia, North American, etc.). The characteris-
tics of these options are stated by Berrou et al. (2007)
as the physical radius of each entity, the speed profile
drawn from preferred speeds of real pedestrians in sim-
ilar locations and context and the personal space (ori-
ented in the direction of movement) surrounding each
entity, also drawn from a distribution of measurements
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Locations of measurement points see Figure 4.
on real people. These are also sensitive to local condi-
tions (crowding or lack thereof), context (stairs, escala-
tors), and projected intentions of neighbours.
Legion SpaceWorks, which supersedes the original
Legion Studio, has been found to be the most advanced
and realistic simulation model available for micro-level
pedestrian analysis (Helgason et al., 2010; Charlton,
2011) following a comprehensive review of agent-based
software. Primarily used by architects and civil engi-
neers, one of the greatest innovations from Legion Stu-
dio is that in Legion SpaceWorks users are no longer
mezzanine
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level -4 (platform U5)
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level -2 (shopping stre
et)
level -3
mezzanine
ultrasonic
anemometer
anemometer
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level -4 (platform U5)
(shopping street)
warm air
cold air
Figure 6: Possible movement of air masses inside the station. 3D-
model (left) and picture (right) of the staircase connecting level −4,
−3, −2.
required to define the paths the agents take, but instead
only define the origin and exit point of the pedestrian.
Route modifiers (stairs, flat paved areas, bottlenecks),
are then added to the model to trigger a change in the
movement, activity or destination of the pedestrian, al-
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Figure 7: Number of agents on their starting positions on level −4
within the pedestrian simulation model.
lowing for a more organic and realistic pedestrian flow
to be achieved. In the past Legion SpaceWorks has been
used to perform virtual experiments on the design and
operation for railway stations, sports stadiums, airports,
transport hubs, etc. to assess the impact of different
physical designs or levels of pedestrian demand.
3.1 Creating a pedestrian simulation model of
Alexanderplatz
Using a 3D SketchUp model of Alexanderplatz, 2D CAD
plans of each platform and concourse areas within the
station were extracted for use within Legion Space-
Works. Following the importation of these plans, 2048
agents were placed throughout the lowest level (level −4)
to represent the highest demand found on these plat-
forms, as defined by the German Federal Railway Au-
thority (Blennemann, 2005). Of the 2048 agents 236
were located on each platform, distributed as shown
in Figure 7, and 788 agents were distributed evenly
throughout each of the trains. The simulation repre-
sented a scenario where two trains arrived at the same
time, with waiting commuters on both platforms. At the
same moment an incident resulting in the release of a
toxic agent occurred. The characteristics for each of the
agents were configured to represent Northern European
commuters. The agent’s reaction time to an alarm sound-
ing were defined in accordance with British Standards
for a transportation hub (British Standards Institu-
tion, 2004) which refers to six key categories of fire
evacuation analysis; alertness, familiarity, building type,
staff training and alarm type. In accordance with these
guidelines, in each of the scenarios simulated, no agents
reacted to the alarm sounding in the first 90 seconds, the
majority of the agents reacted at around 165 seconds and
all agents had reacted within 240 seconds.
3.2 Assessing possible evacuation routes
With an accurate 2D model of Alexanderplatz set up
within Legion SpaceWorks, three different scenarios
were simulated to assess the egress from the station:
1) Agents have free choice to find the shortest route cho-
sen by Legion SpaceWorks out of the station based on
the characteristics of the agents; 2) Agents are guided
along pre-defined paths by blocking certain evacuation
routes which have become contaminated and are now
Level -1 (exits west)
Level -1 (exits east)
Level -2 (shopping street)
Level-3 (mezzanine west) Level -3 (mezzanine east)
Level -4 (platform U5)
Mean number of agents per m²
0.0           1.0          2.0           3.0
Figure 8: Simulation “free choice”: cumulative mean density map.
deemed unsafe; 3) Agents were guided through the ad-
jacent tunnels to reach the nearest emergency exit.
The “free choice” simulation shows, that the major-
ity of the agents chose to exit using the central stairs
at either end of the platform, via level −3 and exiting
on level −2 (see Figure 8). Only a small percentage of
the agents selected to use the escalators that ran directly
from level −4 to level −1. The agents that chose to exit
via the west central stairways were quickly subjected to
congestion on level −4. This congestion was sustained
for several minutes and spread to the west central stair-
way located on level −3 as more and more agents tried
to evacuate via this route. Following the evacuation from
level −4, the agents were able to remain at a consistent
speed while exiting the model.
In the second simulation, “predefined exit” agents
were guided to the relevant stairs at the far west side
of level −4. Agents continued up these sets of stairs un-
til they reached level −1 where they were navigated to
use only one predefined exit located on the south side of
level −1 west (see Figure 9). Although this route had be
chosen to prevent agents exiting via routes highly con-
taminated with lethal gas, the limited number of exits re-
sulted in high levels of congestion, most significantly for
those agents located on platform 2. This resulted from
agents attempting to exit the model via only one exit.
Agents exiting via the defined route from platform 2 be-
came obstructed by those agents exiting from platform 1
(see Figure 10). The obstruction resulted in a build up of
agents from platform 2 on the selected stairs ways, re-
sulting in no significant movement from agents exiting
from platform 2 for a period of 3 minutes.
In the third simulation, “adjacent tunnels” agents
were guided along the subway tunnels connected to
level −4 to emergency exits located 140 m from either
end of the platform. Agents were allowed to choose
which exit they considered the nearest (see Figure 11).
This simulation showed that following some initial con-
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map.
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Figure 10: Simulation “pre-defined exit”: obstruction caused by
agents exiting from platform 1.
gestion as agents tried to exit from the platform to the
tunnels, agents were able to move at a consistent speed
and were able to exit the model with relative ease. The
most significant congestion was created by those agents
trying to exit using the west exit. This was due to the
proximity of the trains in relation to the end of the plat-
form. In comparison to the east side of the platform,
where a larger gap was found between the trains and the
end of the platform (19.8 m), agents exiting via the west
exit were only able to progress through a 2.9 m gap.
The egress times for each of the simulations are sum-
marized in Figure 12. It is shown that the agents were
able to exit Alexanderplatz the quickest when they had
free choice to decide to take the shortest route. Agents
were slowest to exit the model when they were guided
on pre-defined paths. In the “pre-defined” simulation in
particular it took 17:05 minutes for all the agents to exit
the model, even though the first agents began to exit the
model in a comparable time to the agents in simulation
“free choice”. This significant increase in time is a result
of the congestion caused by agents exiting platform 1
and blocking agents exiting from platform 2 (see Fig-
ure 10), due to the agents only being able to exit via
Level -4 (platform U5)Level -4 (west tracks) Level -4 (east track)
Mean number of agents per m²
0.0          1.0           2.0           3.0
120m 120m
Figure 11: Simulation “adjacent tunnels”: cumulative mean density
map.
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Figure 12: Egress from Alexanderplatz under different simula-
tions. )* In simulation “adjacent tunnels” agents evacuated through
level −4 only.
one exit. The resulting bottleneck caused agents exiting
via the pre-defined route from platform 2 to make no
significant movement for a period of 3 minutes. In the
“adjacent tunnel” simulation agents were able to clear
the platform within 8:15 minutes, held up slightly due to
the proximity of the trains to the end of the platforms.
However, due to the distance the agents needed to travel
to reach their exit point, it took 12:33 minutes before all
agents had exited the model.
4 Evaluating the effects of gas
dispersion on evacuation routes
The simulations discussed in sections 2 and 3 showed
the individual results from both tracer gas experiments
and pedestrian evacuation simulations based on Alexan-
derplatz, respectively. Although the path of the dispersed
gas has been established, it has not been shown how this
data relates to the location of the agents within the sep-
arate simulations. It is known that agents are able to
exit Alexanderplatz the quickest when they have free
choice. But, results from the tracer gas experiment have
shown that this route is the most contaminated by SF6
gas. Therefore it is unknown how many of these agents
would be subjected to lethal levels of gas for a significant
period of time to cause serious long lasting health issues
or even death. Therefore, the study aimed to combine the
results from the tracer gas experiments with the pedes-
trian simulation data to highlight how such data could
be used to aid in the development of a safety system for
transportation hubs.
4.1 Initial examination
From simply overlaying the outputs from the pedestrian
simulation with the contamination maps produced from
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Figure 13: Concentration and position of agents in simulation 1 and 2, 5 min after release.
the tracer gas experiments it is possible to carry out an
initial examination of those agents which may have been
exposed to high levels of gas. This was calculated by as-
suming a respiratory minute volume of 8 l, a value for
resting humans, so for fleeing people the inhaled amount
of gas might be significantly higher. Figure 13 shows the
position of the agents from the simulations “free choice”
and “pre-defined exit” after 5 minutes, against the corre-
sponding contamination map. It is clear that those agents
which have chosen the quickest route “free choice” have
also moved through the areas of high contamination lo-
cated on the west mezzanine on level −3 and the shop-
ping street located on level −2. In the “pre-defined exit”
simulation where agents were restricted to exit level −4
by only one set of stairs on each platform, the result-
ing congestions means that there are more agents still
on the platforms level (line U5) at this time. However,
as explained in Section 2.4 there was no significant con-
tamination on this level in the first 6 minutes following
of the release of the gas. Although the agents exit via
a less contaminated route, the evacuation time is nearly
doubled in comparison to simulation “free choice”, due
to this confined route and limited exits allowing signif-
icant congestion to build up. Therefore from this initial
examination it is unclear what problems the increased
exposure time of 17 min could cause.
In “adjacent tunnel” simulation agents escaped
through the subway tunnels joined to the platforms on
level −4. Results from the pedestrian simulations show
that the platforms are cleared in around 8 minutes. As
tracer gas results show that the concentration of SF6
does not increase to high levels on the platforms dur-
ing this time, most agents would have not inhaled any
gas. But the evacuation of agents via subway tunnels
is not always a feasible option. The evacuation through
subway tunnels involves walking on the tracks which is
only safe if there is no train traffic and the live rail (if
present) is deactivated. This evacuation route is also not
designated for self-rescue and would instead need to be
guided by operator personal. As such a route may not
always be an option, this study concentrated on further
examining the other simulations. By focusing the study
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Table 1: Chemical properties of SF6 and Phosgene and the mass
equivalents causing the same concentration levels
Chemical properties SF6 Phosgene
molar mass 146.05 g mol−1 98.92 g mol−1
density gas 6.63 kg m−3 )a,b 4.53 kg m−3 )c
boiling point 2 −64 °C 7.44 °C
EU classification Very toxic T+
equivalents Mass 4.0 kg 2.709 kg
Particle number 27.387 mol−1 27.387 mol
volume 613,85 l )a,b 613,85 l )a,c
gas
Volume liquefied 1928 cm−3
a T = 0 °C b P = 1013 hPa c T = 15 °C
on two feasible options, a free choice route and a con-
trolled route, a more detailed examination can be car-
ried out with regard to the safety of each route. From the
initial examination it remains unclear whether a shorter
but more contaminated route would be more problem-
atic compared to a longer but less contaminated route.
However, Legion SpaceWorks allows for the time (every
0.6 seconds) and location (x, y and z coordinates) of
each agent throughout the simulation to be exported as
a workable raw data file. The SF6 concentrations were
interpolated for each level of the whole subway station
with the inverse distance method. By knowing both the
position of each agent using data outputted by the pedes-
trian simulations and the changing concentration levels
of SF6 throughout the station, it is possible to calculate
the amount of gas inhaled by each agent as they move
through the model. This will provide a more definitive
understanding of how the choice of evacuation route
could affect the agents health.
4.2 Phosgene instead of sulfur hexafluoride
As previously mentioned, to get an understanding of
how gas released from a CBRNE attack would disperse
throughout the station, SF6 was used as a tracer gas. If
the results were converted to phosgene (CClO2) instead
of SF6, about 2.7 kg phosgene is needed to have the
same contamination values as 4 kg of SF6. If liquefied
2.7 kg of phosgene occupies a volume of approximately
2 litres it can be easily carried in a cooled container (see
Table 1). Today phosgene is most commonly used in
the production of polycarbonate. It gained infamy as a
chemical weapon in World War I (Spiers, 2010). The
World Health Organisation estimates a world produc-
tion of up to 3 billion tons in 1997 (MacConnell,
1997). According to the Acute Exposure Guideline Lev-
els (AEGL) of the US Environmental Protection Agency
two values can be used for this case study:
AEGL-2 is the airborne concentration [. . . ] of
a substance above which it is predicted that the
general population, including susceptible individ-
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Figure 14: AEGL Level (equivalent to 10 min exposure) agents
reach in different simulation.
uals, could experience irreversible or other seri-
ous, long-lasting adverse health effects or an im-
paired ability to escape.
AEGL-3 is the airborne concentration [. . . ] of a
substance above which it is predicted that the gen-
eral population, including susceptible individuals,
could experience life-threatening health effects or
death.
(AEGL, 2002)
Phosgene AEGL-2 and AEGL-3 have a value of
600 ppb and 3600 ppb, respectively, validated for an ex-
posure period of 10 min. Based on an agent’s choice of
exit route, the interpolated SF6 concentration along this
route and the time it takes for the agent to evacuate from
the station, each agent was assigned an equivalent con-
centration level to 10 minutes of phosgene exposure.
This process allows for the cumulative amount of in-
haled phosgene to be calculated for each agent and to
compare the cumulative value to the validated AEGL-2
and AEGL-3 exposure periods. In doing so, the number
of agents reaching and surpassing these values could be
estimated. Figure 15 shows the position of agents when
they reach the AEGL-2 and AEGL-3 level for the differ-
ent evacuation simulations.
Based on the results shown, a safety assessment of
different evacuations was made from the total numbers
of agents reaching the different levels. Figure 14 sum-
marizes these results and indicates the number of agents
that exceed the two levels. As expected from the initial
examination, in simulation 1 the agents using the west
staircases between the platforms U5 and the shopping
street begin to exceed the AEGL-2 level when they were
on the west mezzanine level. Those agents that are slow
to respond and as a result are caught in the congestion
that builds on these staircases are also the first agents to
reach the deathly AEGL-3 level in this location. As the
evacuation continues, more deaths are expected on the
shopping street level. From the completed study, the re-
sults show that in simulation 1, around 350 agents will
die during an evacuation of Alexanderplatz, whilst more
than one thousand will have long-lasting health issues.
This study could not take into account the possibility
that those agents that exceed AEGL-2 level of contami-
nation may become impaired resulting in increased con-
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Figure 15: Average SF6 distribution, timing sequence of SF6 contamination and position of agents (Simulation 1 and 2) when they reach
the equivalent AEGL-2 or AEGL-3 level (Acute Exposure Guideline Levels) (AEGL, 2002).
gestion. Immobilized or dead agents may become ob-
stacle for the other agents. Therefore it is expected that
the number of deaths could be significantly higher than
predicted. In the second simulation, even with the low
contamination, due to the long evacuation time, it was
established that over 200 agents will exceed the AEGL-2
level before they are able to exit the subway station, but
no agents will exceed the AEGL-3 level. The combined
tracer gas results and pedestrian simulation shows that
all the agents that exceed the AEGL-2 level will do so
in the congestion build up on level −1 as they try to exit
via a single exit (see Figure 15). However, although one
single exit was defined in simulation 2, level −1 west
contains two possible exits. It can therefore be assumed
that if both exits were used, the congestion build up on
Level −1 west would not be so severe, allowing for the
agents to exit faster, reducing the number of agents that
exceed the AGEL-2 level.
In comparing the two simulations it is clear that
agents exiting via a controlled, pre-defined route are able
to do so in the safest manner, regardless of the increased
evacuation time. The results show that the majority of
the agents in simulation 2 were exposed at a level below
600 ppb and no agents exceeded the AGEL-3 level and
therefore no agents would have died exiting via this
route. This is in agreement with the work by Gross
(2015).
5 Conclusion
This study has shown that different evacuation routes
in Alexanderplatz station have different risk levels. The
tracer gas dispersion which established the risk levels
presented in this paper were based on only one sam-
ple test. It has been proven by Pflitsch and Küsel
(2003) that the natural air flow through subway tunnels
is not constant and changes according to outer atmo-
sphere conditions, temperature and moisture difference
between underground and over ground air. This constant
change in atmospheric conditions results in a fluctuating
climatology within subway stations. Although the pre-
sented results are therefore only valid for this particular
air flow situation measured at the tunnel portals (see Fig-
ure 3), it has been shown how a guided evacuation could
reduce the number of deaths and injuries in a case of a
terrorist attack with chemical warfare. Generally it was
shown that staying in lower levels for as long as possible
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could be a good strategy to leave the area of risk even if
it takes longer. Tsukahara et al. (2011) who examined
the Daegu subway fire in 2003 came to the same conclu-
sion. They suggest a deeper subway level underlying the
lowest platforms for evacuation which is not applicable
due to high building costs. It can therefore be proposed
that a dynamic evacuation guiding system based on sub-
way climatology is a more applicable solution and as
such should be taken into account in designing new auto-
matic evacuation systems. Such systems would consider
the location and cause of the evacuation, the resulting
dispersal of gas, smoke, etc. and the subway climate at
the time. In doing so, the system could identify the most
endangered areas and guide passengers via an adaptive
escape route using audio and visual techniques. In catas-
trophic circumstances people want to go out to the over
ground as quickly as possible, so intelligent evacuation
systems may guide people against their natural flight be-
havior. Information on the evolution of the emergency
situation could also simultaneously be relayed back to
the rescue forces to help to plan the rescue and evacua-
tion procedures, by being able to answer questions as to
where to concentrate the rescue teams. The development
of such a system forms the main aim of the OrGaMIR
project and is where future research will lie.
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